This is a discussion article by a supporter of Free Our Unions. We welcome responses and debate.
All active trade unionists are all too familiar with the myriad ways the law restricts industrial action. We are restricted to striking over “trade disputes” with our own employer, ruling out strikes in solidarity with other workers, or over wider political issues. To hold a legal strike, we have to notify the employer of our intention to ballot, giving them time to challenge the ballot data we send them. We then need to ensure at least 50% of those balloted return their ballots, an arbitrary threshold not applied to any other area of democratic life. If we work in one of several “essential services”, in addition to securing a majority of returned ballots in favour of action, we also need at least 40% of all those balloted to vote for action in order for strikes to proceed. We are then required to give 14 days’ notice of any action to the employer.
The newly-elected Labour government has said it will remove some of those restrictions, such as the turnout thresholds in strike ballots. Others, such as the prohibition on solidarity strikes, will remain on the statute books.
All of these are restrictions imposed by the state. But there are additional restrictions on our ability to take swift and effective action that are imposed by the bureaucracies of our unions, over and above the restrictions required by law.
In almost every union in the British labour movement, decision-making power over if and when workers can ballot for industrial action, and what action they can take if a mandate is secured, lies with a union body at least one step removed from rank-and-file members in workplaces. One major union in which there is some exception to this is the Communication Workers Union, where branches in its telecoms sector (but not its postal sector) can call ballots and action. In almost all others unions, the body with decision-making power is the National Executive Committee. In some unions, a sub-committee of an NEC, usually headed by a full-time union official, is the relevant body.
This means that, if a group of workers in a single workplace wish to launch a dispute and industrial action ballot over a workplace-specific issue, and subsequently go on strike, they effectively have to seek permission to do so from a committee on which none of them sit, unless it is a workplace in which one or more members of a given union’s NEC happen to work. In some unions, unelected officials, people who rank-and-file members have no means of recalling or directly holding to account, are able to intervene in decisions about if and when ballots and strikes can take place.
In unions with more developed democratic cultures, the NEC’s role might only be to rubber stamp a request for a ballot, and subsequent action, that has been submitted by a branch or workplace group. But even there, the additional layer of bureaucracy functions to slow down workers’ efforts to take action, even if that is not the intention.
It should be an aim of rank-and-file democracy to place decision-making power as close to the shop floor as possible. Why shouldn’t union branches, or workplace groups, have the constitutional power to launch ballots — and then, to directly call action if and when a mandate is secured?
For the purposes of determining whether an action has been “authorised” by a union, the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 says that authority can be given by:
“(a)by any person empowered by the rules to do, authorise or endorse acts of the kind in question, or
(b)by the principal executive committee or the president or general secretary, or
(c)by any other committee of the union or any other official of the union (whether employed by it or not).”
In other words, it’s up to a union itself to decide which of its bodies has the power to authorise strikes. A union can choose, within its own structures, to empower branches and workplace groups to launch ballots and call action.
For sure, such a measure would need to have clearly defined limits. It would obviously not be democratic for a single branch to unilaterally launch a dispute or ballot involving members of other branches. For ballots involving multiple branches, regional committees or equivalent sectoral bodies within unions, with representation from all affected branches, would need the final say. In unions that have industrial sector committees, or combine committees of workplace representatives covering a given sector, those bodies might be the most appropriate body to sanction ballots and action for the union’s membership across that sector. And an NEC would remain the appropriate body to sanction national ballots.
But when workers in a single workplace, or small group of workplaces, all organised in the same, single union body (usually a branch), want to ballot, and take action, over a local issue, why should they not have the power to do so?
An opponent of such reform might argue that, since it would be the union as a whole, and not an individual branch, that would be liable for damages in the case of any legal action by employers against improperly authorised action, it’s necessary for decision making to remain at union head offices. But unions have legal and industrial relations departments, staffed by paid professionals, to check statutory requirements are being met. Why couldn’t delegates from branches or workplaces liaise with those departments directly, instead of having to go via NEC members or full-time officials?
Almost every union claims to be “member-led” — a slightly clunky formulation, surely less clear than the simpler term “democratic”, but nonetheless an indication that the union believes itself to be directed from below, rather than above. Which union will dare to be the first to imbue that term with much more practical content, by giving rank-and-file bodies at workplace or branch level the power to declare disputes, launch ballots, and call action?